a kind of double punishment.Such feelings

Among the many challenges facing the euro zone crisis confronts European politicians, the complexity of the message to issue public opinions legitimately disoriented by an unprecedented situation is not the least of the difficulties.

The first dimension of the problem concerning the assessment to focus on the European response to this crisis, which in part depends on the confidence that one can have in the future of the single currency.

It is easy in this regard to point the finger at the initial denial of reality to the Greek situation, the rigidity of Berlin, the divisions and procrastination and their devastating effects on the markets and the level of the euro, before the final abandonment of the "main principles" EMU.

But it would be more constructive and more just in the period, pay tribute to the political and economic importance of the adopted on May 9, 2010 750 billion rescue plan, the political courage of Angela Merkel, the pragmatism of the ECB, the lifting of the taboo on the word "integration", which had long disappeared from the European vocabulary, or even the virtues economic adjustment in the euro to decline.

While the eurozone crisis is far from over and States still seek to drag their heels on the path of greater economic and political integration as soon as the danger will be discarded. But it is reasonable to estimate that EMU will emerge strengthened from this event if it expands fast management of perennial crisis and especially the collective disciplines instruments which it has failed since its creation, in the spirit of the recent proposals of the European Commission.

The second political challenge posed by the crisis, potentially explosive, concerns the intelligibility and legitimacy in terms of social justice of remedies necessary across the continent and the political chessboards: austerity, drastic objectives for remediation of the finance, reduction of social programs, liberal policies of return to competitiveness and economic efficiency, as the proposals of the Monti report on the recovery of the internal market.

For many Europeans, and not just left, these remedies appear to mark a paradoxical and socially unjust, return to this "liberalism" whose excesses have produced the most serious financial crisis since that of 1929.

This sentiment feeds continuity between the financial crisis américano-mondiale 2007-2008, grécoeuropéenne, 2010, and multiple interference between one and the other: impact of the crisis on public finances European and vice versa; role of markets and financial institutions in the worsening of the Greek situation, then that of the euro; conjunction with the undertaking of reform of the financial regulation to the European and global level political criminalisation of speculators and market.

It is therefore quite natural that opinion way in the monetary crisis and budget European "liberal anglo-saxon model" and the resultant in the generalization of austerity, a kind of double punishment.

Such feelings, added to the harshness of the necessary adjustment in the country the more indebted, is socially and politically dangerous. This is why EU leaders would have any interest to find the political courage to explain to their constituents that the eurozone crisis is specific and largely autonomous in its jurisdictions to the global financial crisis.

It is not main origin the excesses of financial innovation, the greed of bankers and deficiencies in control systems (although on the latter point...), but, on the one hand, the excessive economic heterogeneity in the euro area and the incompleteness of the EMU and, on the other hand, poor management of public affairs in a number of States, characterized by the constant increase in public debt, the deficit of productivity and competitiveness, the lack of structural reforms, even tax evasion and corruption.

In other words, Europe paying the price - which will be heavy in terms of growth, employment and preservation of the "European social model" - twenty years of errors of governance, laxity and nationalism, imbalances in EMU to the weakness of the Lisbon strategy.

It is high time for the lessons clearly.